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CAN’T TOUCH THIS? MAKING A PLACE FOR
TOUCH DNA IN POST-CONVICTION DNA
TESTING STATUTES
Victoria Kawecki+
DNA testing is to justice what the telescope is for the stars: not a
lesson in biochemistry, not a display of the wonders of magnifying
optical glass, but a way to see things as they really are. It is a
revelation machine”1
On February 11, 1987, in Fort Collins, Colorado, a passing cyclist
discovered the body of a brutally murdered woman exposed in an open field.2
Earlier that morning, fifteen-year-old Timothy Masters had seen the same
body.3 Convincing himself that the body was a mannequin, Masters did not
report the sighting to police.4 This misstep, coupled with the proximity of the
Masters’s home to the crime scene 5 and the discovery of questionable
“character” evidence, 6 led investigators to interrogate Masters for ten hours
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2014, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2011, Gettysburg College. The author wishes to thank John Sharifi for his exceptional and
invaluable insight, guidance, dedication, tenacity, and inspiration throughout this process. She
would also like to thank her colleagues on the Catholic University Law Review for their work on
this Comment, and her legal writing professors, who taught her to question what she thinks she
may know and to always lead with her conclusion.
1. BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFIELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE
GOES WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT xviii (2003) [hereinafter SCHECK ET AL.].
2. Masters v. People, 58 P.3d 979, 983 (Colo. 2002). The partially nude body of
thirty-seven-year-old Peggy Hettrick was found “murdered and sexually mutilated” in a field in
Fort Collins, Colorado. Drawn to Murder (CBS News television broadcast Dec. 24, 2011),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/ 8301-18559_162-6025618/drawn-to-murder/. According
to medical reports, Hettrick was fatally stabbed in the back with a five-inch serrated knife.
Masters, 58 P.3d at 983.
3. According to Masters’s father, Masters normally walked straight through the field each
morning on his way to school; however, on the day of the murder, Masters visibly hesitated,
veered off course, and stopped—actions his father later interpreted as obvious indications that
Masters had seen the body. Drawn to Murder, supra note 2.
4. TIMOTHY MASTERS WITH STEVE LEHTO, DRAWN TO INJUSTICE 3 (2012) (explaining
that the body resembled a Resusci Anne Simulator doll which is normally used for CPR practice).
The cyclist that eventually reported the discovery to the police also mistook the victim’s remains
for a mannequin. Drawn to Murder, supra note 2. Investigators noted that the victim’s body was
clean of blood, which added credibility to Masters’s assumption. Id.
5. Masters, 58 P.3d at 983 (explaining that “[t]he body was left within several hundred feet
of [Masters’s] home, and could be seen from [his] bedroom window”).
6. The Colorado Supreme Court admitted into evidence numerous graphic drawings,
writings with sexual overtones, and a suitcase filled with pornographic photographs of female
genetalia, all seized from Masters. Id. at 983–84. Although the Colorado Supreme Court held
that some of the drawings and writings could only lead to an inference of bad character, which is
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shortly after the murder, and to arrest him ten years later. 7 Masters was
charged and later convicted of a murder he did not commit.8 After spending
almost a decade in prison, Masters was released in 2008.9 Masters’s release
and exoneration were partially based on the cutting-edge deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) analysis of microscopic skin cells left behind by the perpetrator on the
victim’s clothing,10 a method colloquially known as “touch DNA” testing.11
Fortunately for Masters, Colorado’s post-conviction DNA testing statute,
which permits testing of biological evidence if the petitioner proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that “[f]avorable results of the DNA testing will
demonstrate the petitioner’s actual innocence,” is broad enough to allow DNA
analysis of skin cells. 12 Masters, in this regard, was lucky to have been
prosecuted in Colorado.
Although states acknowledge the importance of providing avenues for
demonstrating actual innocence, inmates are often severly hampered by
restrictive post-conviction DNA testing statutes in many states often limiting
access to the type of DNA testing that led to Masters’s exoneration.13 The
ability to obtain any kind of post-conviction DNA testing hinges on the
structure of the statute. The availability of specific types of DNA testing
depends on the statute’s definition of testable material (“biological material
requirement”), and its emphasis on the expected impact of the testing
prohibited by Colorado Rule of Evidence 404, the court found that their admission was “harmless
error” in light of the entire record. Id. at 1002–04 (applying COLO. R. EVID. 404(b)).
7. Drawn to Murder, supra note 2. After Masters’s father—his only alibi witness—died,
the state again pursued Masters’s arrest by reevaluating previously collected evidence. MASTERS
WITH LEHTO, supra note 4, at 148–49.
8. Masters, 58 P.3d at 983 (noting Masters’s conviction by jury verdict).
9. Trevor Hughes, Tim Masters Formally Exonerated for 1987 Murder of Peggy Hettrick
of Fort Collins, THE COLORADOAN (Fort Collins, Colo.) (June 28, 2011), available at
http://www.coloradoan.com/article/20110628/UPDATES01/110628016/Tim-Masters-formally
-exonerated-1987-murder-Peggy-Hettrick-Fort-Collins.
10. Miles Moffett, DA Set to Drop Masters Case, DENVER POST (Jan. 25, 2008),
http://www.denverpost.com/ci_8071788. The Masters defense team traveled to Amsterdam,
where the victim’s clothing underwent touch DNA testing. Drawn to Murder, supra note 2.
11. Touch DNA, BODE TECHNOLOGY, http://www.bodetech.com/forensic-solutions/dna
-technologies/touch-dna/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2013) (explaining that touch DNA can link
perpetrators to a particular crime if the perpetrator leaves enough skin cells behind on an item at
the crime scene).
12. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-413(1)(a)–(b) (2012). Similar to the District of Columbia’s
Innocence Protection Act (IPA), the Colorado statute uses equivocal language, such as the term
“demonstrate.” See infra notes 121, 173 and accompanying text (analogizing the IPA’s
materiality language to a “some evidence” standard).
13. See, e.g., State v. Solman, 29 A.3d 183, 188–90 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (denying an
application for touch DNA testing despite the petitioner’s argument that the purpose of the statute
is to provide access to potentially exculpatory DNA evidence), cert. denied, 33 A.3d 739 (Conn.
2011); Hood v. United States, 28 A.3d 553, 560, 566 (D.C. 2011) (denying an application for
touch DNA testing despite the IPA’s alleged purpose to allow access to “powerful techniques of
DNA analysis”).
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(“materiality requirement”). 14 Some statutes broadly define biological
material, allowing for touch DNA testing if the petitioner can show—with
varying levels of certainty—that the test results will support his or her claim of
innocence.15 Other statutes regulate the types of evidence that can be tested to
such an extent that touch DNA is not plainly eligible for post-conviction
consideration.16 Finally, the District of Columbia’s Innocence Protection Act
(IPA) definitively repudiates touch DNA testing. 17 The IPA altogether
precludes post-conviction touch DNA testing, setting a potentially dangerous
precedent for other jurisdictions with similar statutes.18 Had Masters sought
post-conviction relief in the District of Columbia, he would probably still be
incarcerated.
The IPA is an extreme example of the problematic and restrictive language
that plagues many post-conviction DNA testing statutes.19 Typical of this type
of statute, the IPA presents two obstacles that a touch-DNA petitioner must
overcome. First, the statute requires that the testing will help to demonstrate
the petitioner’s actual innocence. 20 Second, the IPA limits testing to

14. See infra Part I.D (explaining the significance of the biological material and materiality
requirements in post-conviction DNA testing statutes in the District of Columbia, Maryland, and
Texas).
15. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(a)(5)(iii) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp.
2012); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(d)(1)(i) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.71(B), 2953.74(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2012) (allowing for
post-conviction DNA testing if the petitioner has met certain requirements, including a showing
that the results are “outcome determinative”).
16. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102kk(a) (2009), construed in Solman, 29 A.3d at 188
(holding that there must “be a factual basis to conclude that biological evidence is present on the
evidence prior to testing,” which must be more than a good-faith assertion); TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 64.01(a)–(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012), construed in Swearingen v. State, 303
S.W.3d 728, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (holding that the statute requires “that all evidence to be
tested must first be proven to contain biological material”).
17. Hood, 28 A.3d at 566 (discussing D.C. CODE § 22-4133(2001 & Supp. 2012)). The IPA
includes a collection of post-conviction statutes. D.C. CODE §§ 22-4131 to 22-4135 (2001
& Supp. 2012). This Comment uses the collective “IPA,” even when discussing the specific
post-conviction DNA testing provision.
18. Hood, 28 A.3d at 557–60.
Nevertheless, the IPA is considered a model
post-conviction remedy statute
Unavailability of Adequate Post-Conviction Remedies,
MID-ATLANTIC INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.exonerate.org/about-2/causes-of-wrongful
-convictions/unavailability-of-adequate-post-conviction-remedies/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).
Judicial interpretation of the IPA’s restrictive provisions could influence those states where
appellate courts have not yet considered touch DNA evidence. See, e.g., infra note 144 (noting
that Maryland and the District of Columbia appear to be the only jurisdictions in which the
highest appellate courts have considered touch DNA evidence under their post-conviction DNA
testing statutes).
19. See infra Part I.D. (discussing different types of biological material and materiality
requirements that are commonly found in post-conviction DNA testing statutes).
20. D.C. CODE § 22-4133(d) (requiring a “reasonable probability” that DNA testing will
“help establish that the applicant was actually innocent”).
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“biological material,” 21 which it strictly defines to include only seven
materials: the contents of a “sexual assault forensic kit, semen, vaginal fluid,
blood, saliva, visible skin tissue,” and, in some instances, hair.22
In 2011, the D.C. Court of Appeals squarely faced the question of whether a
request for touch DNA testing could be granted under the IPA in Hood v.
United States.23 In Hood the petitioner was charged with murder after he was
found inside the home of the dying victim.24 Although the petitioner argued at
trial that he was in the victim’s home to defend her from a third-party attacker,
the jury found him guilty.25 Following the enactment of the IPA, the petitioner
moved for touch DNA testing, claiming that the testing would identify the
actual assailant. 26 The court foreclosed the opportunity to test the DNA
contained in skin cells, interpreting the statute’s “visible skin tissue”
qualification to exclude samples that could not be seen by the unaided eye.27
The court also concluded that the testing requested would not meet the
statute’s materiality requirement.28
The court’s interpretation of the IPA highlights the counterintuitive nature of
the
statute’s
language:
although
enacted
to
provide
relief
to the wrongfully convicted, 29 the statute prohibits the testing of probative
evidence.30 The D.C. Council has recognized this juridical gap and, after the
Hood decision, has considered redefining “biological material” in the IPA to
allow for touch DNA testing. 31 The Council’s amendment process has
21. Id. § 22-4133(a) (allowing petitioners to “apply to the court for DNA testing of
biological material” that meets the requirements of the statute).
22. Id. § 22-4131(2) (emphasis added). This definition applies to the IPA in its entirety, not
only to the post-conviction DNA testing provision. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-4131 (explaining
that the section’s definitions apply to the entire chapter).
23. 28 A.3d 553, 555 (D.C. 2011); see also Reply Brief for Appellant at 3, Hood, 28 A.3d
553 (No. 08-CO-1581) (framing the issue on appeal as a case of misapplication and
misinterpretation of the IPA).
24. Hood, 28 A.3d at 556–57.
25. Id. at 557.
26. See id. at 557–58 (noting that the appellant sought to establish that he was not the
assailant by requesting DNA testing of evidence found at the crime scene).
27. Id. at 559–60.
28. Id. at 564–66 (finding that the IPA requires a petitioner to make a showing of more than
a mere possibility that the results would prove his or her innocence).
29. COUNCIL OF THE DIST. OF COLUMBIA COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 14th Council Period
B. 14-153 (2001) [hereinafter D.C. COMM. REP.]. The appellant in Hood contended that the
purpose of the IPA “is to enable wrongfully convicted persons to use the powerful techniques of
DNA analysis to prove their innocence.” Hood, 28 A.3d at 560.
30. Hood, 28 A.3d at 563 (noting that the IPA is exceptional because, although it establishes
a right to post-conviction DNA testing, a petitioner’s request to test trace amounts of skin cells
that could potentially exonerate a petitioner can still be denied).
31. In July 2012, D.C. Councilmember Mary Cheh proposed the “Innocence Protection
Amendment Act of 2012,” which seeks to define “biological material” more broadly to ensure the
availability of DNA testing for “potentially exonerating evidence.” B. 19-880, 19th Council
Period (D.C. 2012).
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revealed the difficulty in wording a post-conviction statute to fairly balance
competing interests without prohibiting touch DNA evidence testing.32
This Comment presents an alternative to the limiting threshold that the IPA
and other similarly restrictive statutes place on an inmate seeking access to
potentially exonerative touch DNA testing. Part I provides a brief history of
the use of DNA technology in criminal investigations and in the courtroom.
This Comment then briefly discusses the rapid evolution of DNA testing
technology, specifically focusing on touch DNA. Part I concludes by
explaining the common requirements for relief in state post-conviction DNA
testing statutes. Part II categorizes these statutes by whether the language
permits touch DNA testing. Finally, Part III suggests that unreasonably
restrictive statutes, such as the IPA, should be restructured to combine a
discerning materiality requirement with a technologically neutral biological
material requirement. A standard that balances the importance of rectifying
wrongful convictions with the value of preserving state resources allows
actually innocent individuals to further capitalize on the “revelation machine”33
that is DNA technology.
I. THE NEW “GOLD STANDARD”:34 DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Considered common parlance in today’s courtroom, DNA refers to the
genetic material found in each cell that encodes biological identity. 35 The
human genome consists of 3.2 billion nucleotides strung together to form the
familiar double helix.36 Disentangling the double helix revealed that roughly
99.5 to 99.7% of genetic material is identical among all humans. 37 The

32. See Public Hearing: B. 19-880, Innocence Protection Amendment Act of 2012
& Re-entry Faciliatation Amendment of 2012 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 19th Council
Period (D.C. Sept. 25, 2012), http://dc.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view-id=12&clip_id=1396
[hereinafter IPA Amendment Hearing] (video recording of public hearing accessed through
Council Hearings Archive).
33. SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, at xviii (comparing DNA testing to telescopes for its
ability to reveal previously unknown evidence in criminal cases).
34. Mark Hansen, The Uncertain Science of Evidence, 91 A.B.A. J. 48, 50 (2005) (quoting
Paul C. Giannelli, Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve University) (characterizing DNA
analysis as the “gold standard” among forensic sciences).
35. See Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 291, 294 (2010); see also DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 5 (2010) (noting the long history of using genetics in the courtroom); RON C.
MICHAELIS, ROBERT G. FLANDERS, JR. & PAULA H. WULFF, A LITIGATOR’S GUIDE TO DNA:
FROM THE LABORATORY TO THE COURTROOM 215 (2008) [hereinafter MICHAELIS ET AL.]
(describing briefly the history of DNA analysis in the courtroom).
36. See Murphy, supra note 35, at 294 (noting that the human genome consists of
nucleotides stored in paired chromosomes). DNA is composed of two strands of nucleotides that
are bound together to form a double-helix structure. MICHAELIS ET AL., supra note 35, at 7–8.
37. KAYE, supra note 35, at 42–43; Murphy, supra note 35, at 294–95.
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remaining miniscule percentage denotes an individual’s unique genetic
information.38
In 1984, British geneticist Sir Alec Jeffreys discovered this variation in the
DNA nucleotide sequence, using restriction fragment length polymorphism
(RFLP) technology39 to isolate portions of the DNA strands.40 Through this
methodology—called “DNA fingerprinting”—Jeffreys was able to identify
individuals by their DNA.41
A. Rapidly Evolving Technology
One of RFLP technology’s drawbacks is that it requires a large amount of
DNA to produce an accurate result. 42 To combat this problem, scientists
developed polymerase chain reaction (PCR) analysis, a method that can
replicate small quantities of DNA exponentially to create a usable sample.43 A

38. KAYE, supra note 35, at 42–43; Murphy, supra note 35, at 294–95. There are
“standard locations in the [human] genome where the sequence” of nucleotides varies enough to
distinguish individuals. NORAH RUDIN & KEITH INMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC DNA
ANALYSIS 38 (2d ed. 2002).
39. See Kamrin T. MacKnight, Comment, The Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR): The
Second Generation of DNA Analysis Methods Takes the Stand, 9 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 287, 294, 296–97 (1993) (explaining, in detail, the process of isolating
genetically distinct material using RFLP technology); see also KAYE, supra note 35, at 43–47
(same).
40. Polymorphism refers to the variation in genetic information at a locus, a molecular
location in the genome. RUDIN & INMAN, supra note 38, at 38.
41. MacKnight, supra note 39, at 294. This process identified patterns in the DNA strands
that were specific to the individual from whom the genetic material was drawn. Id. at 296–97;
see also Ricardo Fontg, Comment, DNA Fingerprinting: A Guide to Admissibility and Use, 57
MO. L. REV. 501, 506 (1992) (explaining that DNA fingerprinting can identify individuals with
“virtual certainty”).
42. This cumbersome aspect of RFLP testing was problematic in cases in which the amount
of DNA left by the perpetrator was negligible, or, in older cases, where the DNA sample had
degraded over time. See United States v. Morrow, 374 F. Supp. 2d 51, 65 (D.D.C. 2005). DNA
testing was therefore unavailable in cases even in which the assailant left behind DNA evidence.
SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, at 46. For example, in the post-conviction proceedings for Marion
Coakley, who was convicted of rape, Coakley’s lawyers attempted to use the newly developed
DNA fingerprinting technology when the semen left at the crime scene did not produce a large
enough sample for DNA testing. Coakley v. State, 571 N.Y.S.2d 867, 868–70 (N.Y. Ct. Cl.
1991); see also SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, at 45–46.
43. United States v. Lowe, 954 F. Supp. 401, 408–09 (D. Mass. 1996) (noting that PCR
technology “is important for forensics because it permits DNA profiling of samples containing
much smaller quantities of DNA—such as saliva on a cigarette butt—that cannot be tested via the
RFLP method”). However, PCR is more properly used as an exclusion method rather than as a
positive identification mechanism because of the difference in probability statistics between
RFLP and PCR testing. Id. at 409–10; Morrow, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 58–59. For a detailed
discussion of the differences between PCR and RFLP testing, see generally Lowe, 954 F. Supp. at
409–10; and KAYE, supra note 35, at 178–87. Similarly, courts recognized the fact that PCR
testing is more susceptible to contamination than its RFLP counterpart, requiring greater care in
testing and analysis. KAYE, supra note 35, at 178–79. But cf. id. at 179 (finding “[n]o major
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further technological advancement called short tandem repeats (STR) analysis
blends the speed and quantity-production of PCR analysis with the exactness
of RFLP testing to create an improved technique.44 STR analysis, aided by
PCR amplification, has become the predominant method by which DNA
samples are analyzed.45
B. Practical Application: DNA Evidence in the Courtroom
Investigators and attorneys began using DNA fingerprinting almost
immediately following its inception to aid in identifying—and
excluding—potential perpetrators.46 Judicial reaction to this new evidentiary
tool was initially positive, and very few questions concerning validity and
admissibility arose as DNA evidence was used in the courtroom.47 But, as
DNA evidence became more common, judicial reception of DNA
identification and inculpation chilled.48 Poor quality evidence49 combined with
judicial opinions expressing significant misgivings emerged to slow the transfer of the
technology”).
44. See KAYE, supra note 35, at 187–91 (providing a detailed discussion of STR testing).
STR analysis begins with the amplification techniques of PCR, creating a large enough sample
size for further analysis. See Morrow, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 57 (explaining, in detail, the PCR
process). These copies are used to create a tandem repeat—“multiple copies of an identical DNA
sequence arranged in direct succession in a particular region of a chromosome”—which is
measured to reveal the alleles present at that part of the chromosome and then used to build the
individual DNA profile. Id.
45. Catherine Arcabasico, Chimeras: Double the DNA-Double the Fun for Crime Scene
Investigators, Prosecutors, and Defense Attorneys?, 40 AKRON L. REV. 435, 449 (2007) (noting
that PCR-STR testing is the most widely used testing method in both the field of molecular
biology and the criminal justice system).
46. KAYE, supra note 35, at 54–56 (discussing the value of DNA fingerprinting’s ability to
produce results “completely specific to [the] individual” in criminal investigations); see also
JUSTIN BROOKS, WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 339–42 & n.1 (2010)
(discussing the role DNA evidence played in the Pitchfork case, which was the first application of
DNA fingerprinting to a criminal case) (reprinting and annotating R v. Pitchfork, (2009) EWCA
(Crim) 963, (1)–(2), (11), (13) (Eng.), available at 2009 WL 1321737 (reaffirming the
defendant’s 1988 conviction)).
47. See KAYE, supra note 35, at 60; see also, e.g., People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643,
644 (Albany Cnty. Ct. 1988) (citing the admissibility of DNA evidence as a question of first
impression but ultimately considering DNA evidence to be “the single greatest advance in the
‘search for truth,’ and the goal of convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, since the
advent of cross-examination”), aff’d, 589 N.Y.S.2d 197 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), aff’d, 83
N.Y.S.2d 417 (N.Y. 1994).
48. See, e.g., People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 995–96, 998–99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
The court added a third prong to the admissibility test established in Frye v. United States. Id. at
995–96 (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. 1923)). The new prong required a
pretrial hearing to determine if the laboratory that performed the analysis employed the proper
techniques. Id. The court concluded that the DNA evidence was not admissible to prove the
presence of the victim’s blood on the defendant’s watch because the laboratory failed to use
generally accepted testing techniques. Id. at 998–99.
49. See, e.g., State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 426-28 (Minn. 1989) (excluding DNA
evidence proffered by the government after expressing concerns over false positives, incorrect
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more stringent standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence50 resulted
in an unwillingness to admit DNA evidence and caused courts to subject DNA
testing “to considerably more intense scrutiny than any of the other forensic
sciences.”51 However, with increased judicial oversight and more reliable and
accurate technology, modern DNA testing has been “rigorously validated” in
the legal community,52 and U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts has
asserted that “there is no technology comparable” to PCR-STR testing.53
C. Touch DNA
Improvements in the efficiency and accuracy of methods for building DNA
profiles opened the door for new sources of testable DNA evidence, including
touch DNA.54 Touch DNA refers to the genetic information recovered from
epithelial (skin) cells left behind when a person makes contact with an object.55
During the commission of a crime, an assailant can leave touch DNA samples
matches, the overall unreliability of DNA testing, and the laboratory’s failure to use scientifically
accepted techniques); MICHAELIS ET AL., supra note 35, at 50 (explaining that RFLP tests
produced poor quality data for its earliest court appearances, thus “illustrat[ing] the need for
quality control and quality assurance programs”). Some courts are still wary of DNA evidence’s
reliability due to the potential for human error. See, e.g., United States v. Bentham, 414 F. Supp.
2d 472, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (highlighting the consequences of human error in DNA testing).
50. The Federal Rules of Evidence, although considered to establish more liberal standards
than their predecessors, actually provide a more rigorous test for the admissibility of DNA
evidence. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–92 (1993)
(interpreting FED. R. EVID. 702) (determining that the new Rules of Evidence superseded the
Frye test and replaced the “general acceptance” of the scientific community requirement with a
more burdensome standard requiring the trial judge to assess the scientific validity and reliability
of the testing procedures that produced the evidence). The Daubert requirements also necessitate
more pretrial hearings on the admissibility of expert witness testimony. MICHAELIS ET AL., supra
note 35, at 220. Although judges currently have more discretion regarding the admissibility of
DNA evidence, the Daubert standards mandate closer scrutiny of the validity and reliability of the
evidence. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (requiring the trial judge to “ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable”).
51. MICHAELIS ET AL., supra note 35, at 215.
52. Id.; see also Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52,
62 (2009) (noting that “[m]odern DNA testing can provide powerful new evidence unlike
anything known before”); Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 306 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J.,
concurring) (“I believe that judicial recognition of this new science, and of the profound questions
that it occasions, should, given law’s foundational concern for the determination of guilt and
innocence, be unbegrudging.”).
53. Osborne, 557 U.S. at 62 (noting that modern DNA technology can identify individuals
“with near certainty”).
54. BODE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 11.
55. Touch DNA, DNA FORENSICS, http://www.dnaforensics.com/touchdna.aspx (last visited
Apr. 15, 2013); see Angela L. Williamson, Touch DNA: Forensic Collection and Application to
Investigations, J. ASS’N CRIME SCENE RECONSTRUCTION (Jan. 26, 2012, 6:38 AM),
http://www.acsr.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/Williamson.pdf (explaining that people “shed
tens of thousands of skin cells each day,” and listing potential sources of touch DNA as
“weapons, vehicles, and clothing” as well as “bullet casings, documents, and latent fingerprints”).
For information on how cells are collected for testing, see BODE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 11.
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behind when he or she has used a large amount of force, which deposits cells
on a victim’s clothing or other items implicated in the crime.56 Touch DNA
testing uses the same STR and PCR technology used to test more traditional
sources of DNA—blood, semen, saliva, and other bodily fluids—to test
recovered epithelial cells. 57 The difference between “traditional” DNA
testing—the testing of bodily fluids—and touch DNA testing is the material
from which the DNA is collected, not the method by which the DNA sample is
analyzed.58
Although touch DNA testing uses the same PCR-STR technology that is
used to test other widely accepted sources of DNA, it has failed to garner the
same approval as its bodily fluid progenitors. 59 Touch DNA has received
56. See, e.g., Ex Parte Hammond, 93 So. 3d 172, 175–77 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) (ruling on
whether to allow DNA testing of pants, a wallet, fingerprints on a refrigerator, a towel, shirt,
shoelaces, and car interior in a murder trial). Richard Eikelenbloom, the Dutch touch-DNA
specialist responsible for the exculpatory testing in the Masters case, reenacted the crime to
determine where on the victim’s clothes there could have been enough force for skin-cell transfer.
Drawn to Murder, supra note 2; see also Maureen Callahan, CSI: For Hire, N.Y. POST (Dec. 14,
2008, 3:52 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/item_cFtlsWfOk57J9
3gB3DJt7O/1.
57. Touch DNA is analyzed by first increasing the sample size through PCR amplification
and subsequently analyzing the sample with STR technology. BODE TECHNOLOGY, supra note
11. Another method of analysis, “Low Copy Number” (LCN) analysis, builds a DNA profile
from as few as five to twenty cells, thereby requiring more cycles of amplification than traditional
PCR analysis. Id. By contrast, touch DNA testing refers to a larger sampling of DNA that is
replicated via traditional PCR analysis, which “[is] therefore admissible in court.” Id.; see also
Max Houck & Lucy Houck, What is Touch DNA?, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Aug. 8, 2008),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=experts-touch-dna-jonbenet-ramsey.
This
distinction is important in evaluating condemnations of the technology, as critics sometimes
confuse the two. See, e.g., Paula Hoffman Wulff, Low Copy Number DNA: Reality vs. Jury
Expectations, 41 PROSECUTOR 34 (May/June, 2007) (equating LCN DNA and touch DNA when
many of her critics are targeted at LCN’s much smaller sample size and need for additional
replication).
58. BODE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 11. Although some courts still question the reliability
of touch DNA evidence, the STR technology—the same technology used to test blood and other
“traditional” sources of DNA—used to analyze skin cells has been widely accepted. See Harvey
v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 305 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., concurring) (recognizing that STR testing,
although requiring “literally cellular-size samples only,” is capable of distinguishing “between
any two individuals on the planet”); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting that
STR-PCR testing is the most common method of DNA analysis used in the criminal justice
system).
59. For example, in State v. Nevius, the court rejected the defendant’s petition for touch
DNA testing because there was no evidence that such testing was “generally accepted within the
relevant scientific community.” See State v. Nevius, No. 04-10-0985, 2012 WL 2361516, at *19
–20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 7, 2012). The court referred to touch DNA as “a new DNA
amplification method,” which shaped the court’s analysis of its reliability and admissibility. Id. at
*19; cf. supra note 58 and accompanying text. Additionally, although the judge in Nevius
dismissed the petition, it was without prejudice, and the court indicated it would reconsider the
petition with an expert report addressing the speculative aspects of the request. Nevius, 2012 WL
2361516, at *20. Similarly, a study of the use of DNA to solve property crimes in Denver,
Colorado, indicated that, although touch DNA is a helpful tool, it does not surpass the reliability
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tenuous popular, 60 investigative, 61 and judicial 62 attention, and courts have
expressed concerns about using touch DNA evidence in both pretrial and
post-conviction proceedings.63 Like the Hood court, many other courts have
denied requests to use touch DNA evidence.64 At best, judicial reception of

and usefulness of traditional blood and semen samples. Simon Ashikhmin et al., Using DNA to
Solve High-Volume Property Crimes in Denver: Saving Money, Lowering Crime Rates and
Making Denver Safer, 42 PROSECUTOR 34, 39–40 (July/Aug/Sept. 2008).
60. Touch DNA analysis gained notoriety in the Jon Benet Ramsey case, in which the
Ramseys were exonerated—outside of legal proceedings—of any involvement in their daughter’s
murder. Houck & Houck, supra note 57. Additionally, touch DNA has received national
recognition as a possible tool in solving cold cases around the country. Kevin Johnson, ‘Touch’
DNA Offers Hope in Cold Investigations, USA TODAY, Sept. 23, 2008, at 2A.
61. Law enforcement in some communities routinely use touch DNA analysis in their
investigations. See, e.g., Ashikhmin, et al., supra note 59, at 40 (citing the use of touch DNA to
solve property crimes in Denver, Colorado, but noting that touch DNA is less effective than blood
or saliva); Anita Hassan, Investigators Using ‘Touch DNA’ to Solve Property Crimes, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE
(Mar.
12,
2012,
12:41
AM),
http://www.chron.com/news/houston
-texas/article/DNA-is-solving-property-crimes-3397341.php (discussing efforts of a Texas
community to use touch DNA more frequently for vehicle burglaries and thefts because skin cells
may be left behind even when a perpetrator was wearing gloves); Virginia Hennessey, Monterey
Police Rely More on ‘Touch DNA’ to Find Suspects, MONTEREY HERALD (Aug. 13, 2012, 8:20
PM), http://www.montereyherald.com/local/ci_21294142/Monterey-police-rely-more-touch-dna
-find-suspects (highlighting the use of touch DNA to issue no-name arrest warrants, based
entirely on DNA profiles, to arrest suspects who have left touch DNA evidence on various
surfaces).
62. Raynor v. State, 29 A.3d 617, 626 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (finding no privacy right
in touch DNA left behind by the defendant while sitting in a chair in the police barracks, which
the police later used to tie him to the crime in question), cert. granted, 52 A.3d 978 (Md. 2012);
State v. Reynolds, 926 N.E.2d 315, 317–18 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (granting the defendant’s
request for post-conviction DNA testing, which included touch DNA analysis); State v. Guerrero,
No. M2008-02839-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 2306078, at *4–5 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 8, 2011)
(affirming the defendant’s conviction, which was based on the investigators finding his DNA on
the grip of a rifle used in the murder); State v. Dick, 280 P.3d 445, 448–49 (Utah Ct. App. 2012)
(affirming the defendant’s conviction, which was based, in part, on touch DNA that matched the
defendant and was found on a bandana).
63. Montez v. State, 86 So. 3d 1243, 1244–45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (remanding the
case for an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of touch DNA to determine the authenticity
and reliability of the evidence); see also State v. Carver, 725 S.E.2d 902, 908–09 (N.C. Ct. App.
2012) (Hunter, J., dissenting) (expressing concerns about the sufficiency of touch DNA evidence
in the absence of any other evidence, the lack of precedent for its use, and the questionable
accuracy of the technology due to the potential for contamination in the form of secondary skin
cell transfer, or “if person A touches person B, and person B touches a pen, person A’s DNA can
be found on the pen”), aff’d, 2013 N.C Lexis 52 (N.C. Jan. 25, 2013); Swearingen v. State, 303
S.W.3d 728, 732–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (rejecting the defendant’s petition for
post-conviction touch DNA testing, in part because of the lack of expert testimony establishing
the likelihood that skin cells were deposited on the evidence).
64. State v. Solman, 29 A.3d 183, 190 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (rejecting the defendant’s
petition for post-conviction touch DNA testing), appeal denied, 33 A.3d 739 (2011); Hood v.
United States, 28 A.3d 553, 566 (D.C. 2011) (same); Swearingen, 303 S.W.3d at 733 (same).
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touch DNA evidence has been mixed, and its use is often restricted by statutes
construed similarly to the IPA.65
D. Exonerating the Wrongfully Convicted: Guaranteeing Access to
Post-Conviction DNA Testing Through Statute
Although DNA exoneration has occurred pre-trial,66 DNA exculpation has
had a more profound impact post-conviction.67 Consequently, states began to
acknowledge that the right to exculpatory evidence pre-trial—based on the
landmark ruling in Brady v. Maryland 68—should also apply to post-conviction
proceedings.69 The recognition of the impact of post-conviction DNA analysis
led to widespread efforts to establish the right to post-conviction DNA testing,
which is now codified in forty-nine states.70
Despite the growing importance of post-conviction DNA testing,
post-conviction testing statutes impose several procedural requirements that
can severely restrict an applicant’s access to testing. 71 These restrictive
provisions reflect the tension between the state’s interest in allocating limited

65. See infra Part II (explaining the restrictions that post-conviction DNA statutes placed on
the use of touch DNA).
66. See, e.g., R. v. Pitchfork, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 963, [1]–[2], [11], [13] (Eng.), available
at 2009 WL 1321737 (reaffirming the defendant’s 1988 sentencing). The defendant’s conviction
was based on DNA evidence that also exculpated a prior suspect. BROOKS, supra note 46, at 342
n.1.
67. As of June 2013, DNA evidence is responsible for more than 300
post-conviction exonerations. Know the Cases: Innocence Project Case Profiles, THE
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited June 1, 2013).
68. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the prosecution violated due process by
withholding from the defendant exculpatory evidence).
69. Sewell v. State, 592 N.E.2d 705, 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that, because the
goals of discovery are “the facilitation of the administration of justice and the promotion of the
orderly ascertainment of the truth,” the requirement to disclose exculpatory information applies to
post-conviction requests for forensic testing); State v. Thomas, 586 A.2d 250, 253 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1991) (anticipating that, because of the growing utility of DNA testing, the failure
to grant the defendant’s motion for post-conviction testing could violate Brady); Dabbs v.
Vergari, 149 Misc. 2d 844, 847 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (recognizing a right to post-conviction DNA
testing by applying the Brady principles to post-conviction proceedings); Commonwealth v.
Brison, 618 A.2d 420, 425–26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (remanding the defendant’s case for DNA
testing based on persuasive authority from other states interpreting Brady). The Supreme Court
did not extend Brady to recognize a constitutional right to post-conviction DNA testing, but
instead determined that it was more appropriate for state legislatures to resolve the issue. Dist.
Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 68–69 (2009).
70. Oklahoma remains the only state without a post-conviction DNA testing statute. Access
to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org
/Content/Access_To_PostConviction_DNA_Testing.php (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
71. See generally Kathy Swedlow, Don’t Believe Everything You Read: A Review of
Modern “Post-Conviction” DNA Testing Statutes, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 355 (2002) (detailing
several restrictions on post-conviction DNA testing, including filing timelines, materiality
requirements, financing, and testing procedures).
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resources and the inmate’s right to post-conviction relief.72 The U.S. Supreme
Court acknowledged this tension in District Attorney’s Office for the Third
District v. Osborne, recognizing the value of DNA evidence in exonerating the
wrongfully convicted while simultaneously accepting a state’s need to
condition access to post-conviction remedies for practical purposes.73
To balance these interests, post-conviction DNA testing statutes contain
various threshold burdens that a petitioner must satisfy. For example, citing
the Court’s rationale in Osborne, the Connecticut Supreme Court explained
that, “[t]o reconcile these competing interests, legislatures have imposed
various threshold showings, including materiality requirements.”74 Materiality
requirements, contained in almost every state’s post-conviction statute,
mandate that the requested testing must produce either a reasonable probability
of a different outcome, or evidence that in some way supports the petitioner’s
claim of innocence.75 Additionally, post-conviction DNA testing statutes often
contain threshold provisions in the form of biological material requirements,
which dictate the specific types of material a petitioner may—or may
not—submit for testing.76 The ease with which a petitioner can gain access to
DNA testing under a state’s statute depends on the strength of and relationship
between these requirements.77
1. The Innocence Protection Act: D.C. Code Sections 22-4131 to 22-4135
In 2001, the IPA was adopted following a public hearing to consider the
fashioning of a “set of procedural rules for relief from wrongful conviction”
that reflected the growing trend of legislation enacted to allow for DNA testing

72. Osborne, 557 U.S. at 62–63.
73. Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Samuel Alito explained that restricting post
-conviction access to DNA testing served the interests of promoting finality of judgment and
conserving public resources. Id. at 76–77, 83–84 (Alito, J., concurring).
74. State v. Dupigney, 988 A.2d 851, 860 (Conn. 2010) (citing Osborne, 557 U.S. at 63)
(applying the Osborne Court’s rationale of balancing interests to the interpretation of
Connecticut’s post-conviction DNA testing statute).
75. See Swedlow, supra note 71, at 367–68 (explaining that all state post-conviction DNA
testing statutes contain some sort of materiality requirement, although the required burden of
proof differs); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280–81 (1999) (recognizing that “materiality”
under Brady requires “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different”). Some statutes require a lesser
showing than Brady materiality. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-4133(d) (2001 & Supp. 2012)
(requiring “evidence that would help establish that the applicant [is] actually innocent”); MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC., § 8-201(d)(1) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012) (requiring that the
requested testing has the potential to produce evidence relevant to the petitioner’s innocence).
76. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-4133(d) (requiring the petitioner to test “biological material,”
defined in D.C. CODE § 22-4131(2) (2001 & Supp. 2012)); Hood v. United States, 28 A.3d 553,
559–63 (D.C. 2011) (interpreting the IPA’s definition of “biological material”).
77. See infra Part II (explaining the impact of materiality and biological material
requirements on a petitioner’s access to touch DNA in several states).
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post-conviction.78 The D.C. Council justified enacting the IPA, in part, on the
ground that nineteen other states had similarly codified of a right to post
-conviction access to DNA testing.79
The IPA’s burden scheme, requiring both materiality and testable—per the
IPA’s definition—biological material, demonstrates the typical structure of a
post-conviction DNA testing statute.80 To apply for testing under the IPA, a
petitioner must: (1) ensure that biological material is still available for testing
and explain why it was not tested previously; (2) submit an affidavit asserting
his actual innocence; and (3) satisfy a materiality requirement. 81 Since its
enactment, District of Columbia courts have interpreted and qualified the
IPA’s procedural restrictions.
a. Interpreting the IPA: Hood v. United States
The seminal decision interpreting the IPA’s post-conviction DNA testing
provisions is Hood v. United States.82 The Hood case arose from a robbery
and murder committed in Northwest Washington, D.C., on the night of May
18, 1989. 83 Police found Charles Hood in the home of Helen Chappelle
following a violent struggle that ultimately caused her death. 84 Hood was
arrested and charged with first-degree murder, among other charges. 85
Although Hood argued at trial that an unknown third party was responsible for
Chappelle’s death, he was ultimately convicted in March of 1991.86

78. D.C. COMM. REP., supra note 29.
79. Id..
80. See infra Part I.D.1.a.i–ii (discussing the IPA’s materiality and biological material
requirements).
81. D.C. CODE § 22-4133; see also United States v. Cuffey, No. F-3044-97, 2003 WL
23202076, at *2 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Dec. 23, 2003) (discussing the requirements that petitioners must
meet under the IPA to obtain post-conviction DNA testing).
82. 28 A.2d 553 (D.C. 2011). The Hood decision provides the most comprehensive
discussion and interpretation of the requirements an applicant must satisfy under section 22-4133
of the IPA.
83. Id. at 555–57.
84. See id. at 555–56. Witnesses saw Hood run past Chappelle into her house, and then saw
her follow him inside. Id. The witnesses also heard sounds of a struggle and Chappelle yelling
and screaming as if in pain, followed by silence. Id. The police found Chappelle semi-conscious,
resulting from a severe beating to her head and face. Id. at 556. Chappelle died eleven days later
from her injuries. Id.
85. Id. at 556. A jury convicted Hood of one count of first-degree burglary with intent to
steal, one count of first-degree burglary with intent to assault, one count of mayhem while armed,
one count of armed robbery of a senior citizen, one count of first-degree murder while armed
under the theory of felony murder during the commission of mayhem, and one count of first
-degree murder while armed under the theory of felony murder during the commission of armed
robbery. United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Supplemental Application for Post-Conviction
DNA Testing and Motion for New Trial at 1–2, Hood, 28 A.3d 553 (Crim. No. F-5686-89)
[hereinafter United States’ Opposition].
86. Hood, 28 A.3d at 557.
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After the court denied his direct appeal, Hood filed several pro se motions
for post-conviction relief.87 Hood’s fifth motion, filed in 2002, implicated the
newly enacted IPA, resulting in the court’s appointment of counsel to assist
Hood in applying for DNA testing.88 Hood’s petition included a request for
touch DNA analysis of several items collected at the crime scene.89 The trial
court denied Hood’s motion, finding that he failed to satisfy both the biological
material and materiality requirements of section 22-4133.90 On appeal of the
trial court’s order, the D.C. Court of Appeals defined the limits of the IPA’s
restrictions in the context of a post-conviction request for touch DNA testing.91
i. Defining “Biological Material”
The IPA defines “biological material” as “a sexual assault forensic
examination kit, semen, vaginal fluid, blood, saliva, visible skin tissue, or
hair.”92 The presence of one of these seven biological materials is necessary to
obtain DNA testing under the IPA. 93 Before enacting the IPA, the D.C.
Council heard testimony from Executive Assistant Chief Terrance Gainer of
the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), who explained that the
department did not have the proper facilities to fully support the evidence
preservation provision of the IPA.94 The Council accommodated the MPD’s

87. United States’ Opposition, supra note 85, at 2. Hood filed his pro se motions under
section 23-110 of the D.C. Code, which allows an inmate to attempt to reduce his or her sentence,
alleging that the evidence supporting his conviction was insufficient. D.C. CODE § 23-110 (2001
& Supp. 2012); United States’ Opposition, supra note 85, at 2–3.
88. Brief for Appellee at 14, Hood, 28 A.3d 553 (No. 08-CO-1581), 2010 WL 8020321
(explaining that Hood requested DNA testing of several pieces of evidence, including the victim’s
rings, a knife and scissors found near the victim, a wrench found in a drawer, and both Hood’s
and the victim’s clothing). The court ordered testing of Hood’s clothing and the knife for blood
evidence, but that testing was inconclusive. Supplemental Application for Post-Conviction DNA
Testing and Motion for New Trial at 3–4, Hood, 28 A.3d 553 (Crim. No. F-5686-89) [hereinafter
Supplemental Application].
89. Because testing for blood evidence was inconclusive, Hood requested touch DNA
testing on the victim’s rings, the wrench, the handle of the knife, and a purse with a broken strap
found near the victim. Supplemental Application, supra note 88, at 11.
90. The trial court denied Hood’s motion for touch DNA testing on the grounds that
epithelial cells do not meet the IPA’s definition of “biological material” and that the presence of a
third party’s skin cells on the items in question would neither include nor exclude Hood as the
true perpetrator. Order at 6–8, Hood, 28 A.3d 553 (Crim. No. F-5686-89).
91. Brief for Appellee at 3–4, Hood, 28 A.3d 553 (No. 08-CO-1581), 2010 WL 8020321.
92. D.C. CODE § 22-4131(2) (2001 & Supp. 2012) (defining “biological material”).
93. D.C. CODE § 22-4133(a) (2001 & Supp. 2012) (outlining when a party may request
testing of biological material); see also D.C. CODE § 22-4131(5) (defining “DNA testing”).
94. D.C. COMM. REP., supra note 29 (referring to the provision of Bill 14-153, whichwould
eventually become D.C. Code § 22-4134, which requires law enforcement to preserve evidence
collected from a crime scene for as long as the convicted perpetrator is incarcerated).
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“very valid concern”95 by expressly defining “biological material” so that the
MPD need only preserve “small samples of blood, or hair, and not entire
automobiles and couches.”96
Although the IPA’s definition of biological material specifically requires
“visible skin tissue,” the IPA’s legislative history provides no definition of the
term “visible.”97 In construing the term’s meaning, the Hood court relied on
the plain meaning of the statutory language and legislative intent.98 Drawing
on the Council’s concerns about evidence preservation, the court ultimately
defined “visible” as “perceptible by [normal] vision,” excluding the
microscopic skin cells tested in touch DNA analysis.99
The court premised its decision on the structure of the IPA as a whole.100
Both section 22-4133 (post-conviction DNA testing) and section 22-4134
(evidence preservation) of the IPA use the same definition of biological
material. 101 The court explained, “[w]e cannot construe ‘visible’ narrowly
when the question is whether skin tissue evidence must be preserved for DNA
testing, yet broadly when the question is whether it is subject to that testing.”102
Acknowledging the strain of a broad definition of “biological material” on
police resources for evidence preservation, the court retained a narrow
definition for all provisions of the IPA, including the post-conviction DNA
testing provision.103 Short of legislative intervention, the court provided no
scenario allowing for DNA testing of evidence outside of the exhaustive list of
biological materials provided in section 22-4131.104

95. Id. As introduced, the original Bill 14-153 did not expressly define “biological
material.” Hood, 28 A.3d at 561. The preservation concerns of the MPD prompted the current
biological material requirement in the statute. Id.
96. D.C. COMM. REP., supra note 29. The Council also noted that the IPA’s preservation
requirement contains an exception that allows for the disposal of physical evidence after five
years if the incarcerated individual is notified and given 180 days to apply for DNA testing of the
evidence. Id.
97. Hood, 28 A.3d at 559 (emphasis added) (addressing the interpretation and definition of
the term “visible”).
98. Id. at 559–61 (construing the term “visible” according to its ordinary meaning, per its
dictionary definition).
99. Id. at 560.
100. See id. at 562 (noting the relationship between the DNA testing provisions and the
evidence preservation provision of the IPA).
101. Id. at 562 n.28. The definitions in section 22-4131 apply to all sections of the IPA.
D.C. CODE § 22-4131 (2001 & Supp. 2012).
102. Hood, 28 A.3d at 562 n.28.
103. Id. at 562.
104. Although the Hood court focused specifically on touch DNA testing, the court’s
deference to the statute’s plain language suggests that, short of a direct constitutional challenge,
only the legislature can alter the statute’s definition of “biological material.” See id. at 562–63.
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ii. The Relationship Between Materiality and Actual Innocence
In revising Bill 14-153, the D.C. Council relied heavily on testimony from
the U.S. Attorney’s Office, which emphasized the need to condition access to
post-conviction DNA testing in order to conserve limited public resources and
to respect the finality of convictions.105 Finding the testimony persuasive, 106
the Council included in the IPA the requirement that the petitioner show that
“there is a reasonable probability that testing will produce non-cumulative
evidence that would help establish that the applicant was actually innocent” of
the crime of which he was convicted in order to gain access to DNA testing.107
The court interpreted this language as a materiality requirement, obligating
the petitioner to establish “more than a mere possibility that the test results
would help [the applicant] prove his actual innocence.”108 The petitioner need
only show that the result of the testing would “assist him to establish his actual
innocence,” assuming that DNA could be recovered.109 The court made clear
that a favorable result is only one step in the petitioner’s showing of actual
innocence.110 The court’s interpretation of the statutory language respects the
scope of the Council’s purpose, reflecting both the recognition of the need to
correct wrongful convictions and the need for practical limitations on access to
testing.111

105. D.C. COMM. REP., supra note 29 (providing the statements of Terrance Gainer,
Executive Assistant Chief of Police, Metropolitan Police Department, and Kenneth L. Wainstein,
U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia).
106. Id. (noting the reaction of Councilmember Sharon Ambrose and other members who
adopted the recommendations).
107. D.C. CODE § 22-4133(d) (2001 & Supp. 2012); United States v. Cuffey, No. F-3044-97,
2003 WL 23202076, at *3 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Dec. 23, 2003) (denying the petitioner’s request
because conclusive DNA testing had already been performed, thus precluding the petitioner from
showing that testing would produce new evidence that would help establish his innocence).
108. Hood, 28 A.2d at 564.
109. See Hood, 28 A.3d at 564–65. The court noted that a petitioner is not always entitled to
an assumption that DNA testing will provide usable DNA evidence if there is a reason to doubt its
presence. Id. at 564 & n.43.
110. See id. at 564 n.42 (finding that the purpose of testing under section 22-4133 “is to
develop new evidence that would support a motion to vacate a conviction or grant a new trial on
the ground of actual innocence”). The standard is a lesser showing than the outcome-changing
materiality under Brady, as the court indicated that the evidence should “support” a motion to
vacate a conviction or for a new trial under D.C. Code § 22-4135(g)(2) (2001), which requires
“proof of actual innocence by at least a preponderance of the evidence.” Hood, 28 A.3d at 564
n.42; see also infra note 173 and accompanying text (likening the IPA’s materiality requirement
to a “some evidence” standard).
111. D.C. COMM. REP., supra note 29 (hearing testimony both advocating for broad access to
a post-conviction DNA testing and advocating for limits on access to testing to preserve limited
public resources and to ensure the finality of convictions).
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b. The Innocence Protection Amendment Act of 2012
Less than a year after Hood was decided, D.C. Councilmember Mary Cheh
introduced a bill to amend the IPA’s “biological material” definition in section
22-4131, for the purpose of “ensur[ing that] potentially exonerating evidence
can be tested for DNA.”112 The amendment seeks to eliminate the “visible”
qualification of skin tissue as biological material and to add several other
materials to the definition, including a catchall provision allowing for the
testing of “other identifiable biological material.”113 The amendment does not
address the materiality requirement in Section 22-4133 or the potential limits
imposed by the Hood court’s interpretation. 114 The legislation also fails to
address the concerns raised by the court and Council members on the
revision’s potential impact on the IPA’s evidence preservation provision.115
The Council’s Committee on the Judiciary considered the proposed
amendment during a public hearing on September 15, 2012, with testimony
from the defense bar and representatives from the U.S. Attorney’s Office.116
Although the witnesses agreed that the IPA’s definition of “biological
material” is unduly limiting and out of touch with current DNA technology,117
the two camps disagreed on the role of the IPA’s materiality requirement in
broadening access to potentially exonerative DNA evidence. 118 The

112. B. 19-880, 19th Council Period (D.C. 2012) (explaining the purpose of the Innocence
Protection Amendment Act of 2012).
113. Id. (defining biological material as “the contents of a sexual assault examination kit; and
any item that contains blood, semen, hair, saliva, skin tissue, fingernail scrapings, bone, bodily
fluids or other identifiable biological material that was collected as part of the criminal
investigation or may reasonably be used to incriminate or exculpate any person for the offense”).
The amended definition also clarifies that the focus of the definition is the material containing
DNA, not the evidence from which the DNA was collected. See id.
114. See infra notes 162–65 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text (noting the relationship between
sections 22-4133 and 22-4134).
COUNCIL,
116. Innocence
Protection
Amendment
Act
of
2012,
DC
http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/lims/searchbylegislation.aspx (search “B19-880”) (last visited June
1, 2013).
117. The defense-oriented witnesses supported a broad definition of biological material. See,
e.g., The Innocence Protection Amendment Act of 2012: Public Hearing on B. 19-880, Comm. on
the Judiciary, 19th Council Period, B. 19-880 (D.C. Sept. 25, 2012) (statement of Chief
Legislative Counsel for the Public Defender Service of the District of Columbia Laura E.
Hankins) [hereinafter Public Hearing] (supporting the definition’s revision); id. (statement of
Sydney Hoffmann); id. (statement of Special Counsel to the U.S. Attorney for the District of
Columbia Shawn Armbrust). The prosecution-focused witnesses also supported the revision.
See, e.g., id. (statement of Renata Kendrick Cooper) (supporting the definition’s revision); id.
(statement of Dr. Jason Kowalski).
118. Compare Public Hearing, supra note 117 (statement of Sydney Hoffmann) (arguing that
a petitioner should not be required to demonstrate a reasonable probability of actual innocence
before the DNA is tested), and id. (statement of Shawn Armbrust, Executive Director of the Mid
-Atlantic Innocence Project) (same), with id. (statement of Renanta Kendrick Cooper) (arguing
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Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project suggested that the materiality requirement
should be replaced by a relevancy requirement. 119 Conversely, the U.S.
Attorney’s Office argued that a broad definition of biological material warrants
a showing of materiality.120 Ultimately, Chairperson Phil Mendelson asked for
additional briefing on the practices of other jurisdictions to aid in the
amendment process.121 As of the publication of this Comment, the statute has
not yet been amended.122
2. Maryland Code Section 8-201
In drafting Maryland’s post-conviction DNA testing statute, the Maryland
General Assembly cited the release of seventy-six wrongfully convicted
individuals as reason for the legislation.123 Consequently, the statute has been
described as “a mechanism for exoneration of the actually innocent.” 124
Mindful of the focus on actual innocence, the Maryland Court of Appeals in
Gregg v. State construed section 8-201 of the Maryland Code as crafted to
promote the ease of access to post-conviction DNA testing.125 The statute’s
threshold procedural requirements reflect this purpose.
Maryland requires a defendant both to fulfill a biological material
requirement and to prove materiality. 126 Section 8-201 defines “biological
evidence” as evidence that “includes, but is not limited to, any blood, hair,
saliva, semen, epithelial cells, buccal cells, or other bodily substances from
which genetic marker groupings may be obtained.”127 Section 8-201 does not

that the Council must limit the definition of “biological material” with “some notion of
materiality”), and id. (statement of Dr. Jason Kowalski) (same).
119. Id. (statement of Shawn Armbrust) (misinterpreting the Hood decision as requiring the
same showing of actual innocence for DNA testing as that required by the Brady standard: that
the DNA test results would undermine confidence in the trial’s outcome).
120. Id. (statement of Renata Kendrick Cooper) (explaining that a materiality requirement is
essential and would “reduce the burden on law enforcement to preserve biological material for
future DNA testing while still promoting the goals and fairness sought by the IPA”).
121. IPA Amendment Hearing, supra note 32, at 00:51:47 (question to testifying witness by
Chairperson Mendelson).
122. See Innocence Protection Amendment Act of 2012, supra note 116 (indicating that the
Council has not taken action on Bill 19-880 since the September 25 hearing).
123. MD. GEN. ASSEMB. DEP’T OF LEG. SERVS. FISCAL NOTES, REV’D, S.B. 694, 2001 Sess.
(2001) (explaining that DNA testing exonerated seventy-six individuals nationwide, and in
sixteen cases, “led to the identification of the real perpetrator”).
124. Thompson v. State, 909 A.2d 1035, 1043 (Md. 2006). When considering the
post-conviction legislation, the Maryland General Assembly rejected a provision that would only
allow post-conviction DNA testing if it had been previously unavailable to the defendant. Id.
125. Gregg v. State, 976 A.2d 999, 1009 (Md. 2009) (interpreting the amendment to
“improve[] the existing remedy by making it easier for qualifying petitioners to establish
entitlement to such testing”).
126. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(b) & (c)(1) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp.
2012).
127. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(a)(2).
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exhaustively define biological material; rather, the statute’s “other bodily
substances” provision functions as a catch-all, suggesting that any material
containing DNA can be tested.128
With respect to materiality, section 8-201 instructs the court to order DNA
testing where “a reasonable probability exists that the DNA testing has the
scientific potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a
claim of wrongful conviction or sentencing.” 129 In 2003, the Maryland
legislature significantly revised the statute in order to “relax[] the standard” for
entitlement to testing.130 As it stands, the petitioner need only make a prima
facie case that the test results have the potential for relevance to a claim of
wrongful conviction, or even to sentencing.131
3. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 64.01 and 64.03
Texas’s post-conviction DNA testing statute provides an example of a state
law that was based on the outdated procedures by which convicted individuals
could obtain DNA testing.132 Article 64.03 was enacted to provide access to
testing that did not “unnecessarily inhibit[] the use of [DNA] evidence.”133
Although the Texas legislature does not require the petitioner to prove actual
innocence, it did construct the statute to address judicial economy and the
practical use of state resources.134

128. Id. Other states define testable material in a similarly broad manner. For example,
Ohio’s statutory definition of biological material is a comparable catch-all provision, defining
biological material is “any product of the human body containing DNA.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2953.71(B) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2012). Connecticut, on the other hand, provides no
definition of biological material. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102kk (2009); see also CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 54-102jj(a)(1) (defining “DNA testing”—applicable to both post-conviction testing and
evidence preservation—as “forensic deoxyribonucleic acid testing”).
129. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(c)(1).
130. See Gregg, 976 A.2d at 1004–06 (discussing the legislative history of section 8-201).
The Maryland Court of Appeals noted that the amended statute’s purpose is “to provide a means
for incarcerated persons to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of
wrongful conviction or sentencing.” Arey v. State, 929 A.2d 501, 510 (Md. 2007).
131. See Gregg, 976 A.2d at 1011 (approving the petitioner’s request for DNA testing despite
overwhelming evidence against him).
132. See S. RESEARCH CTR., TEX. BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 3, 77th Reg. Sess. (Jan. 25, 2001)
(Westlaw) [hereinafter S. Research Ctr.] (acknowledging as problematic that scientific
developments in biological evidence have surpassed many DNA testing statutes); see also State v.
Emerick, 868 N.E.2d 742, 745 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that the development of Y-STR
testing, in part, prompted changes to the Ohio code to allow “otherwise qualified inmates . . . to
take advantage of advances in technology that were not available at the time of their trials”).
133. S. RESEARCH CTR., supra note 132.
134. TEX. H.R., TEX. BILL ANALYSIS, H.B. 1011, 78th Reg. Sess. (2003) (noting the number
of requests the statute’s enactment elicited, expressing concern about the use of resources on
“frivolous claims” and suggesting limiting court-appointed attorneys to only those cases where
there are reasonable grounds to file a motion for post-conviction testing); TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012).
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Article 64.01 defines “biological material” as “an item . . . that contains
blood, semen, hair, saliva, skin tissue or cells, fingernail scrapings, bone,
bodily fluids, or other identifiable biological evidence that may be suitable for
forensic DNA testing,” which includes “the contents of a sexual assault
evidence collection kit.”135 On its face, this language resembles that of the
Maryland statute. 136 However, in Swearingen v. State, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals imposed an additional limit, holding that the petitioner must
provide “concrete evidence” that biological material is present on the items he
or she wishes to test.137 Although this type of threshold increases the burden
on the petitioner, it does not categorically exclude certain materials from
testing.138
With respect to materiality, a petitioner under the Texas statute must show,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she “would not have been
convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing.”139
This higher threshold reflects the legislature’s intent “to provide an avenue by
which a defendant may seek to establish his innocence by excluding himself as

135. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01(a)(1) & (2) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012).
136. Compare MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp.
2012), with TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01(a)(1) & (2).
137. Swearingen v. State, 303 S.W.3d 728, 732–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Routier v.
State, 273 S.W.3d 241, 256 (Texas Crim. App. 2008)) (noting that, under the court’s standard, “a
mere assertion or a general claim that existence of biological material is probable will fail to
satisfy the appellant’s burden”). Connecticut similarly focuses on the presence of biological
material on evidence rather than the biological material itself. See State v. Solman, 29 A.3d 183,
188 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102kk (2009)) (requiring a factual
basis in the petitioner’s assertion that the evidence he or she seeks to test contains biological
material, which the statute does not define).
138. See Swearingen, 303 S.W.3d at 732–33 (entertaining the possibility that touch DNA
could be permissible under the post-conviction DNA testing statute if the petitioner can show that
biological material is present on the evidence in question).
139. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A). The preponderance of the evidence
standard applied to Texas’s post-conviction DNA testing statute requires a petitioner to show that
there is more than a fifty percent chance that he or she would not have been convicted if the
testing had provided exculpatory results. In re Morton, 326 S.W.3d 634, 641 (Tex. Ct. App.
2010). Connecticut’s post-conviction DNA testing statute also requires a showing that the testing
would have altered the trial’s outcome. State v. Dupigney, 988 A.2d 851, 860–61 (Conn. 2010).
The court must order testing where the petitioner can demonstrate that “[a] reasonable probability
exists that the petitioner would not have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had
been obtained though DNA testing.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102kk(b)(1) (2009); State v.
Martinez, No. CR94230560, 2007 WL 3011054, at *10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2007)
(describing section 54-102kk(b)(1) as the “mandatory” provision for DNA testing when a
petitioner satisfies certain conditions). The court may still consider a request at its discretion if
there is a “reasonable probability . . . DNA results . . . would have altered the verdict” or
sentencing. Martinez, 2007 WL 3011054, at *10 (describing section 54-102kk(c)(1) as a
“discretionary” provision). In either situation, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability
that the testing could have altered the outcome of the original trial. State v. Smith, No.
CR95-68537, 2009 WL 3738829, at *1–2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2009).

2013]

Touch DNA in Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statutes

841

the perpetrator of the offense.”140 The Court of Appeals of Texas determined
that a petitioner can satisfy the statutory burden by showing that the testing
would exclude him as a culpable party and corroborate a defense of
misidentification.141
II. FAILURE TO BALANCE IMPORTANT INTERESTS: INEFFECTIVE STATUTORY
CONSTRAINTS ON TOUCH DNA
The Hood decision conclusively determined that the IPA—in its current
form—does not support touch DNA testing.142 The District of Columbia may
be the first and only jurisdiction to restrict touch DNA analysis so narrowly
under its post-conviction DNA testing statute.143 Relatively few jurisdictions
have addressed whether a request for touch DNA testing can satisfy the
statutory requirements for post-conviction DNA testing. 144 Still, the Hood
court noted that District of Columbia “appears to be the only jurisdiction in the
140. Lyon v. State, 274 S.W.3d 767, 769 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis added); Blacklock
v. State, 235 S.W.3d 231, 232–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (discussing the DNA testing statute’s
legislative history). Ohio’s post-conviction DNA testing statute contains a similar exclusionary
restriction, limiting testing to instances where “the offender shows that DNA exclusion . . . would
have been outcome determinative” at his or her original trial. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2953.74(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2012). The statute could also permit DNA testing if
it would demonstrate innocence by clear and convincing evidence. State v. Ayers, 923 N.E.2d
654, 658 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (noting that the statutory phrase “strong probability” effectively
reduces the burden to a clear and convincing evidence standard).
141. In re Morton, 326 S.W.3d at 644–45. In this case, the appellant sought testing of a
blood-stained bandana in order to establish that it contained the DNA of the victim and an
unknown third party, but not that of the appellant. Id. at 641. Taking all of the evidence into
account, including inconsistencies in circumstantial evidence and the defense theory of exclusion,
the court held that if the DNA testing corroborated the defense theory, “there [was] greater than a
50% likelihood that the jury would have harbored a reasonable doubt as to appellant’s being the
murderer,” thus satisfying the standard. Id. at 645.
142. See Hood v. United States, 28 A.3d 553, 560–62 (D.C. 2011) (holding that legislative
intent required the court to construe “visible” as perceptible to the naked eye, thus ruling out
touch DNA testing, which uses microscopic cells).
143. Even jurisdictions that have denied requests for touch DNA testing have not foreclosed
the possibility of testing. See, e.g., State v. Solman, 29 A.3d 183, 189 & n.6 (Conn. App. Ct.
2011) (holding that a petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable basis that there is biological
material on the evidence he or she wants to test and noting that this standard is similar to the
Texas standard); Swearingen, 303 S.W.3d 728, 732–33 (entertaining the possibility that touch
DNA testing may have been allowed if the petitioner had provided more concrete evidence at trial
that there was biological material on the evidence he sought to test).
144. It seems as though the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the Maryland Court of
Appeals are the only highest courts of appeal to consider touch DNA testing under their
respective state post-conviction DNA testing statutes requirements. Compare Hood, 28 A.3d at
559–60 (decided by the D.C. Court of Appeals), and Gregg v. State, 976 A.2d 999, 1002–03 (Md.
2009) (decided by the Court of Appeals of Maryland), with Solman, 29 A.3d 183 (decided by the
Appellate Court of Connecticut); Evans v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 485 (Ark. Ct. App. 2011)
(decided by the Court of Appeals of Arkansas), Swearingen, 303 S.W.3d 728, 731–35 (decided
by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas), and State v. Reynolds, 926 N.E.2d 315 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2009) (decided by the Court of Appeals of Ohio).
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United States with a statutory right to post-conviction DNA testing that would
deny testing on trace amounts of skin tissue that might provide exoneration,”
amounting to a call for legislative action dependent on the practices of other
jurisdictions.145
However, this reliance on other jurisdictions is misplaced. In the states that
have considered touch DNA testing, the disposition of touch DNA testing
requests has depended on which requirement—materiality or
biological material—is the most burdensome to the petitioner. 146 The
operative requirement in adjudicating a touch DNA testing request, in turn, is
often determined by the way the state balances the rights of the petitioner with
the interests of the state in the drafting its post-conviction DNA testing
statute.147 Differing statutory construction among states has resulted in varied
treatment of touch DNA, including statutes that either disregard practical
resource concerns or acutely restrict the petitioner’s right to potentially
exonerative evidence.
A. Promoting the Interests of the State and Finality of Conviction: Statutes
that Effectively Preclude Touch DNA Testing
In Osborne, the Supreme Court recognized that states must be able to
balance the petitioner’s right to post-conviction relief with the state’s right to
preserve its existing statutory framework.148 Although claiming to address the
rights of the petitioner, states that have denied requests for touch DNA have
generally crafted their statutes with a greater emphasis on resources. 149
Consequently, these statutes, in addition to a stringent materiality requirement,
impose a prohibitive biological material requirement.
1. Judicial Prescription of Testable Material: A Restriction on Touch DNA
Testing
A petitioner seeking touch DNA testing in a jurisdiction that gives greater
weight to state resource concerns must first convince the court that the
evidence in question conforms to the jurisdiction’s definition of testable

145. Hood, 28 A.3d at 563. During the public hearing for the Innocence Protection
Amendment Act of 2012, Chairperson Mendelson requested briefing on the practices of other
jurisdictions. IPA Amendment Hearing, supra note 32, at 00:51:47.
146. See infra Part II.A.1 (explaining that touch DNA is generally precluded in jurisdictions
with strict biological material requirements); infra Part II.B.2 (explaining that
touch-DNA testing is allowed in states where materiality is the petitioner’s only burden).
147. See Hood, 28 A.3d at 562–63. The court recognized the legitimate liberty interest in
post-conviction DNA testing under the IPA, but ultimately concluded that the Supreme Court’s
guidance in Osborne allows states “considerable ‘flexibility’” in structuring the application
process for such testing. Id.
148. Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 62–63
(2009).
149. See supra Part I.D.1–3.
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evidence.150 This limitation on the scope of what is eligible for post-conviction
DNA testing controls the resources a state must expend in preserving
evidence.151 As the Hood court explained, a broad definition of “biological
material” could necessitate preservation of “entire automobiles and couches” in
the event that these items contain skin cells.152
The Hood decision ensured that touch DNA is not testable as a matter of law
under the IPA’s definition of biological material, regardless of the viability of
the evidence or its potential to exonerate the petitioner. 153 The court
recognized the potential for its ruling to contravene the IPA’s purpose, but
concluded that this question could not be resolved judicially.154
The Hood opinion highlighted that the problem with obtaining
post-conviction DNA testing lies not in the fallibility of touch DNA
technology, but rather in the IPA’s structural deficiencies.155 The rationale for
the narrow interpretation of the “visible” qualification—the difficulty in
preserving microscopic biological material—in no way implicates the IPA’s
DNA testing provisions.156 However, as the court noted, each provision of the
IPA uses the same definition of “biological material,” including the
definition of “DNA testing” and the section requiring preservation of
evidence.157 Concluding that the same term could not be construed differently
depending on its function—which implicitly recognizes the conceptual
difference between testing and preservation—the court narrowly defined the
IPA’s biological material requirement and prioritized resource conservation
over the protection of the right to post-conviction DNA testing.158
Similarly, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected a request for touch
DNA based on the appellant’s failure to satisfy the post-conviction DNA
150. State v. Solman, 29 A.3d 183, 188 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (requiring a petitioner to make
a threshold statement that biological material is present for testing and to provide a factual basis
for that assertion).
151. See, e.g., id. at 189 (explaining that a broad definition of biological material “would
require that virtually every piece of evidence in the state’s possession be subjected to DNA
testing”).
152. Hood, 28 A.3d at 561 (citing D.C. COMM. REPORT, supra note 29) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
153. Id. at 562–63 & n.37 (noting that STR testing could be used successfully to analyze
touch DNA samples). The court recognized a small window of opportunity for a constitutional
challenge to the definition of “biological material,” were the petitioner to demonstrate sufficient
materiality. Id. at 562–63. Hood raised, in the alternative, a constitutional argument: a narrow
interpretation of “visible” violated his due process right to demonstrate his innocence. Id.
However the court avoided deciding that issue. Id.
154. Id. at 560, 563.
155. Id. at 564–66.
156. The D.C. Council added the skin-tissue qualification specifically to lessen the evidence
preservation burden on the city. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
157. See D.C. CODE § 22-4131 (2001 & Supp. 2012) (providing definitions that apply to the
entire IPA).
158. See Hood, 28 A.3d at 560–62 & n.28.
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testing statute’s biological material requirement.159 In Swearingen v. State, the
court denied the petitioner’s request for touch DNA analysis, holding that the
petitioner’s assertion that biological material could be recovered from items of
evidence that the perpetrator touched alone was insufficient to meet the
statute’s threshold requirement that “concrete evidence” of the presence of
biological material be shown.160 The court acknowledged, in passing, that a
plain reading of the requirement seems categorically to preclude the use of
touch DNA testing, as it is almost impossible to determine whether biological
material is present without first performing the touch DNA analysis.161
Rather than obligating the petitioner to simply apply to test material
containing DNA, these statutes require the petitioner to demonstrate that the
evidence he or she seeks to test falls within a statutorily defined category of
testable material, a burden that has proved difficult, if not impossible, to
overcome for touch DNA testing.162 The District of Columbia and Texas both
impose biological material requirements judicially, rather than scientifically, to
define testable biological material.163 This is an unnecessary limit on valuable
technology.164
2. More Stringent Materiality: Necessary Conditioning of Touch DNA
Testing
Although statutes with stringent materiality requirements impose greater
limits on touch DNA testing, the petitioner may still satisfy the requirement
under the proper circumstances.165 For example, the D.C. Court of Appeals
159. Swearingen v. State, 303 S.W.3d 728, 730, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
160. Id. at 732–33 (interpreting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01(a) (West 2006
& Supp. 2012)).
161. See id. at 732. The court noted that the petitioner had not provided any expert testimony
at trial to establish that skin cells would necessarily have been deposited in the course of that
particular crime. Id. at 732–33.
162. See Hood, 28 A.3d at 562–63; Swearingen, 303 S.W.3d at 731–32 (setting forth the
criteria a petitioner must meet to qualify for post-conviction DNA testing).
163. Compare supra notes 92–99 and accompanying text (detailing the D.C. Court Appeals’s
interpretation of the IPA’s biological material requirement), and supra notes 135–38 and
accompanying text (noting the additional burden the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals added to
the Texas statutes biological material requirement), with infra notes 176–80 and accompanying
text (explaining that the definition of testable material in Maryland and Ohio is constrained only
by what materials can undergo DNA testing).
164. See infra notes 193–98 and accompanying text (explaining that, because of the
materiality requirement, additional limits on “biological material” are unnecessary and
unreasonable).
165. Materiality requirements are the traditional safeguard for state resources. Dist.
Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 63 (2009) (explaining that
“[a] requirement of demonstrating materiality is common” among state efforts to place conditions
on access to evidence). States with express concerns about resource conservation and
preservation tend to impose a higher materiality threshold than those jurisdictions focused on the
right to post-conviction testing. Compare MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(d)(i)
(LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012) (allowing testing if there is a “reasonable probability” that
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found that Hood failed to demonstrate materiality under the IPA based on his
theory that touch DNA testing would point to the true perpetrator.166 The court
reasoned that the presence of a third party’s skin cells was not dispositive
because it would merely show that the third party touched “ordinary personal
and household objects . . . at some point in time.”167 Confining its analysis to
the facts of Hood’s case—a request to use touch DNA evidence to identify the
true perpetrator—the court did not provide any insight regarding whether a
request for touch DNA testing could ever satisfy the IPA’s materiality
requirement.168
The court left unanswered the next logical question: whether touch DNA
testing sought to exclude the petitioner would demonstrate sufficient
materiality under the IPA. By comparison, a petitioner can meet the Texas
post-conviction DNA testing statute’s high materiality threshold based on a
theory of exclusion.169 Although the Texas Court of Appeals denied a request
for touch DNA testing in Swearingen based on the state of the biological
evidence,170 it is reasonable to believe that a petitioner could meet the statute’s
materiality requirement with a request for touch DNA testing to exclude
himself as the perpetrator.171
By analogy, this exclusion argument could be applied to the IPA. Although
worded differently, both the District of Columbia and Texas materiality
requirements focus on the applicant’s guilt, requiring evidence of actual
innocence or, similarly, that the applicant would not have been convicted.172
testing may “produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence” relevant to conviction or sentencing),
with TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012) (allowing
testing only if the applicant “establishes by a preponderance of the evidence” that he or she
“would not have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing”).
166. Hood, 28 A.3d at 564–66.
167. Id. at 565.
168. The court determined that the presence of a third party’s skin cells on the items Hood
sought to have tested could “not have explained” the “other highly incriminating evidence
against” him. Id. at 565 n.46.
169. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A). A petitioner can satisfy this
requirement by demonstrating that DNA testing would reveal the absence of his or her DNA on
the evidence in question. In re Morton, 326 S.W.3d 634, 641–42 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010)
(recognizing that an exclusion argument will satisfy the statute’s materiality requirement).
170. Swearingen v. State, 303 S.W.3d 728, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (denying the request
for touch DNA testing because the petitioner failed to provide “concrete evidence” that the items
in question contained biological material). The court did not engage in any discussion of the
statute’s materiality requirement. Id. at 731–33.
171. The appellant sought the testing to inculpate another individual, which would not fit the
proposed exclusion scenario. Id. at 731.
172. The Texas statute requires evidence that “the person would not have been convicted if
exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
64.03(a)(2)(A). Comparatively, the IPA mandates “a reasonable probability that testing will
produce non-cumulative evidence that would help establish that the applicant was actually
innocent of the crime for which the applicant was convicted or adjudicated as delinquent.” D.C.
CODE § 22-4133(d) (2001 & Supp. 2012).
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Moreover, the IPA, as interpreted in Hood, appears to impose a lower burden,
resembling a “some evidence” standard. 173 By extension, if an exclusion
argument could satisfy Texas’s harsh materiality requirement, it should be
sufficient to provide “some evidence” of the petitioner’s innocence under the
IPA.
B. Protecting Post-Conviction Rights: Statutes That Allow for Touch DNA
Testing
Of those jurisdictions that have considered a petition for touch DNA testing
in a full appellate opinion, courts have allowed touch DNA testing where the
post-conviction DNA testing statute emphasizes remedying wrongful
conviction.174 Consequently, these statutes impose minimal restrictions, in the
form of broad biological material and materiality requirements, on the
petitioner seeking access to DNA testing.175
1. Inclusive Definition of Biological Material: Proper Language to Permit
Touch DNA Testing
Statutes that appear to weigh the rights of the petitioner more heavily than
the state’s interest in preserving resources provide a greater opportunity to take
advantage of new technology by requiring only that the petitioner seek to test
material containing DNA. 176 Because epithelial cells necessarily contain
173. According to the Hood court, the IPA’s materiality requirement “evidently” obligates
the petitioner to establish “more than a mere possibility that the test results would help [the
applicant] prove his actual innocence.” Hood v. United States, 28 A.3d 553, 564 (D.C. 2011).
However, the court considered this to be a showing “comparable”—not identical—to the
traditional burden of “undermining confidence in the trial’s outcome.” Id. This is a relatively
broad reading that suggests something closer to a “some evidence” standard than one that requires
a change in the outcome of the trial. By analogy, in the District of Columbia, a defendant is
entitled to a jury instruction on his or her theory of the case if there is “any evidence fairly
tending to bear upon the issue,” however tenuous it may be. Rhodes v. United States, 354 A.2d
863, 864 (D.C. 1976) (citing Belton v. United States, 382 F.2d 150, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1967)). For
example, to warrant an instruction on inducement in the D.C. Superior Court, the defendant must
provide “some evidence [of inducement by] the government agent.” Instruction 9.310:
Entrapment, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 9–11 (Barbara E.
Bergman ed., 2012); see also Hernandez v. United States, 853 A.2d 202, 205 (D.C. 2004)
(finding that an instruction for self defense is warranted where the defendant provides “some
evidence”). A defendant need not establish his or her defense by a preponderance of the evidence
in order to demonstrate entitlement to a jury instruction. See Instruction 9.310: Consent Defense
to Sexual Abuse, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra, at 9–16 (explaining the lowering of the
preponderance of the evidence standard).
174. See supra notes 120–25 and accompanying text (explaining the pro-inmate focus of the
Maryland and Ohio post-conviction DNA testing statutes); infra note 185 (noting that the Ohio
post-conviction DNA testing statute values inmates’ rights over judicial economy).
175. See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text. For example, Maryland limits DNA
testing only by requiring that a DNA sample can be obtained from the evidence in question.
Section 8-201 allows for testing on any “bodily substances from which genetic marker groupings
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DNA, 177 this type of biological material requirement does not restrict touch
DNA testing in any way.178 Worded broadly to allow the statute to evolve with
DNA technology, these biological material “requirements” recognize that a
judicially prescribed “testable sample” is no longer a logical possibility. 179
Whether the evidence contains testable DNA is more properly in the purview
of the “testing authority,” rather than a threshold determination for the court.180
2. Broad Materiality: Insufficient Limits on Touch DNA Testing
As a consequence of a liberal biological material requirement, the discussion
of whether touch DNA testing is permitted under this type of statute focuses on
whether the petitioner can satisfy the materiality requirement. For example, in
Gregg, the Maryland Court of Appeals granted the appellant’s petition for
touch DNA testing. 181 The court held that the request met section 8-201’s
“reasonable probability” standard “to produce exculpatory or mitigating
evidence.”182 Based on the argument that touch DNA analysis would connect
a third party to the crime,183 the court concluded that the petitioner’s request
met the statute’s materiality threshold. 184 Unconstrained by the efficiency
concerns underlying the IPA’s materiality requirement, Maryland’s broad

may be obtained,” and specifically enumerates epithelial cells. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC.
§ 8-201(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012).
177. BODE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 11. The Hood court also accepted that skin cells
contain DNA. See Hood v. United States, 28 A.3d 553, 560 (D.C. 2011).
178. The opinions analyzing touch DNA petitions in jurisdictions with broad definitions of
biological material make no mention of whether touch DNA satisfies that requirement. See e.g.,
Gregg v. State, 976 A.2d 999, 1011 (Md. 2009) (requiring a petitioner to present only a prima
facie case that DNA testing has a reasonable probability to produce evidence of exculpation or
mitigation of an offense); State v. Reynolds, 926 N.E.2d 315, 317–18 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009)
(deferring to the “testing authority” to determine the feasibility of touch DNA testing).
179. This was an important consideration raised in the context of revising the IPA. See IPA
Amendment Hearing, supra note 32 (statement of Shawn Armbrust) (explaining that a broad
definition of biological material ensures that the statute will have the flexibility to incorporate
new technology without revision).
180. Reynolds, 926 N.E.2d at 319 (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by
drawing its own conclusions about whether the evidence in question would produce a testable
DNA sample). Because of “[t]he sensitivity and specificity of modern DNA analysis,” it is
improper for the court to define a “testable sample” based only on the briefings of lawyers.
Public Hearing, supra note 123 (statement of Dr. Jason Kolowski); see also Reynolds, 926
N.E.2d at 319.
181. Gregg, 976 A.2d at 1001–02 (requesting DNA analysis of epithelial cells recovered
from the trigger of a gun).
182. Id. at 1011 (reiterating the statutory requirements for post-conviction DNA analysis).
183. The petitioner alleged that a third party, who fired the murder weapon, was present at
the crime scene in the “getaway” van. Id. at 1001, 1011. The petitioner was in the car and
admitted to touching the barrel of the gun, which precluded an exclusion argument. Id. at 1002.
184. Id. at 1011 (holding that because “DNA testing of epithelial cells has the scientific
potential to produce relevant exculpatory or mitigating evidence, the petition, on its face,
satisfie[d] that standard”).
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materiality requirement echoes the Ohio Court of Appeals’ assurance that there
is “no viable argument that matters of judicial economy should supersede the
law’s never-ending quest to ensure that no innocent person be convicted.”185
Although more likely to remedy wrongful convictions, statutes with liberal
materiality requirements invite criticism of practicality and sufficiency,
especially in their treatment of touch DNA testing. Much of the concern
surrounding the use of touch DNA evidence rests on the sufficiency of
skin-cell analysis to identify the perpetrator of the crime. For example, in State
v. Carver, the North Carolina Court of Appeals expressed doubt that touch
DNA was enough to convict the defendant, citing secondary skin-cell
transfer 186 as a source of possible inaccuracy in touch DNA evidence. 187
Similarly, the Hood court explained that the presence of a third party’s skin
cells would prove only a third party’s one-time presence at the crime scene, not
that the cells were deposited by the perpetrator during the crime. 188 Both
courts noted the shortcomings of touch DNA technology in identifying the
actual perpetrator, a function that a broad materiality requirement supports.189
III. “WE ARE ARGUING OVER WORDS HERE”190: STATUTORY LANGUAGE TO
ENSURE POST-CONVICTION ACCESS TO TOUCH DNA TESTING
The variable construction of post-conviction DNA statutes has resulted in
inconsistent standards for the permissibility of touch DNA testing. In some
jurisdictions, allowing for touch DNA analysis based on a broad materiality
requirement invites criticism of technological imperfections and the failure to
address the problem of limited resources. 191 In others, severely restricting
testable material seems to preclude touch DNA testing altogether, disregarding
the petitioner’s post-conviction rights.192 The proper standard is a blending of
both jurisdictional approaches to impose a solid materiality requirement and a
flexible definition of biological material in order to most effectively take
advantage of touch DNA technology.
185. State v. Ayers, 923 N.E.2d 654, 659 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (commending the Ohio
General Assembly for “lowering the standard required to show that DNA testing can be outcome
determinative”).
186. See supra note 63 (explaining the concept of secondary skin-cell transfer, a problem
unique to touch-DNA inculpation).
187. State v. Carver, 725 S.E.2d 902, 909 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (Hunter, J., dissenting), aff’d,
736 S.E.2d 172 (N.C. 2013). The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals in a memorandum opinion, declining to comment on the sufficiency or
shortcomings of touch DNA evidence. Carver, 736 S.E.2d 172.
188. Hood v. United States, 28 A.3d 553, 565 (D.C. 2011).
189. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text (providing the facts of Gregg, in which
the actual perpetrator was inclupated by touch DNA evidence).
190. IPA Amendment Hearing, supra note 32, at 01:03:41 (Chairman Mendelson
commenting on the importance of choosing the proper language for the amended IPA).
191. See supra notes 186–89 and accompanying text.
192. See supra Part II.A.
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A. Elimination of the Judicially Prescribed Testable Sample
A traditional standard of materiality as it applies to touch DNA testing
places a reasonable limit on what a petitioner can test.193 But this standard also
requires a correspondingly broad biological material requirement to ensure the
proper balance between post-conviction rights and the interests of the state.194
Because both requirements aim to conserve state resources, 195 an onerous,
statutorily imposed biological material threshold is unnecessary.196 A more
difficult materiality requirement necessarily limits what evidence the petitioner
can test.197 Therefore, a strict materiality requirement can soundly coexist with
a biological material requirement that simply requires the petitioner to request
DNA testing of “any product of the human body containing DNA.”198

193. See infra notes 214–16 and accompanying text (listing the positive results of a relatively
strict materiality requirement, including conservation of resources and avoiding deficiencies of
positive identification through touch DNA analysis).
194. The Supreme Court has recognized the need for this balance. See Dist. Attorney’s
Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 63 (2009) (emphasizing that
post-conviction DNA testing “laws recognize the value of DNA evidence but also the need for
certain conditions on access to the State’s evidence”). But, many post-conviction DNA testing
statutes fail to establish the proper balance between the rights of the petitioner and the interests of
the state. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the problems of broad materiality requirements); see
also supra Part II.A.1 (explaining the challenges of strict biological material requirements).
195. See State v. Dupigney, 988 A.2d 851, 860 (Conn. 2010) (citing conservation of
resources as the rationale for the strict materiality requirement in Connecticut’s post-conviction
DNA testing statute); State v. Solman, 29 A.3d 183, 189 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (citing
conservation of resources as the rationale for the heightened biological material requirement in
Connecticut’s post-conviction DNA testing statute).
196. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text (explaining the impropriety of a judicial
determination of what constitutes a testable DNA sample).
197. By limiting post-conviction DNA testing to situations where the absence of the
petitioner’s DNA would implicate guilt or innocence, the legislature assuaged concerns that
petitioners would seek to test “virtually every piece of evidence in the state’s possession.”
Solman, 29 A.3d at 189. In the context of touch DNA, the petitioner would likely be limited to
testing those pieces of evidence where the perpetrator would most likely deposit skin cells, such
as the victim’s clothing or the murder weapon. See MASTERS WITH LEHTO, supra note 4, at
363–64 (explaining that the touch DNA analyst uses the crime scene and the facts of the crime to
determine “where force would have been applied by the perpetrator” in order to choose evidence
from which skin cells could be extracted).
198. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.71(B) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2012) (defining
“biological material”). Testifying at the public hearing for the Innocence Protection Amendment
Act of 2012, a representative from the District of Columbia U.S. Attorney’s Office explained that
an expanded definition of biological material necessitates a more restrictive materiality
requirement in order to properly balance increased access with concerns about state resources.
Public Hearing, supra note 123 (statement of Renata Kendrick Cooper). The inverse is also true;
a more restrictive materiality requirement, such as limiting touch DNA testing to theories of
exclusion, mandates a broader biological material requirement to properly balance the competing
interests.
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Although these principles can, and should, be applied to the revision of the
IPA, the statute’s structure requires a slightly different analysis.199 The current
proposed amendment broadens the statute to include touch DNA, but fails to
address the concerns raised by the Hood court. The strict definition of
“biological material” is in place to support the preservation requirement, and
thus cannot be changed without affecting that section of the IPA.200 The two
sections serve different purposes and should be treated differently.
Consequently, the IPA’s current definition of biological material, with the
“visible” qualification, should stand. However, that definition should only
apply to the section of the IPA providing for the preservation of such
material.201 DNA testing requirements should reflect the need and justification
for greater access to testable materials, and thus should be restricted
only to “forensic DNA testing,”202 which is essentially the same as defining
“biological material” as “any product of a human body containing DNA.”203
This can be accomplished by altering section 22-4131’s definition of “DNA
testing” to reflect this language, and by amending section 22-4133 to allow for
“DNA testing,” provided that the other requirements are met.204
B. “Strict” Materiality: Invoking Exclusionary Principles
The proper materiality requirement in a post-conviction DNA testing statute
requires a relationship between the outcome of the testing and the applicant’s

199. The use of the same definition of “biological material” across each of the four
substantive statutes of the IPA, regardless of each statute’s different purpose, makes it difficult to
simply redefine the term. See D.C. CODE § 22-4131(a) (2001 & Supp. 2012).
200. See Hood v. United States, 28 A.3d 553, 562 & n.28 (D.C. 2011). Bill 19-880 proposed
to redefine “biological material” without addressing the interplay between the sections of the IPA.
See B. 19-880, 19th Council Period (D.C. 2012).
201. See D.C. CODE § 22-4134 (2001 & Supp. 2012) (requiring preservation of biological
material). Such a limitation allays MPD concerns about resource conservation. See D.C. COMM.
REP., supra note 82.
202. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102jj(a)(1) (2009). Connecticut’s statutory language is
similar to the definition already incorporated by the IPA, less the reference to “biological
material.” D.C. CODE § 22-4131(5) (defining “DNA Testing” as “forensic DNA analysis of
biological material”).
203. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.71(B). Ohio’s definition of biological material is
similar to any state with a “catchall provision” that allows for testing of anything containing
DNA. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012).
Although the two definitions serve the same purpose, Ohio’s definition dispenses with
unnecessary examples of biological material rendered superfluous by the catch-all provision.
204. Therefore, D.C. Code section 22-4133(a) would appear as: “A person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for a crime of violence
may, at any time after conviction or adjudication as a delinquent, apply to the court for DNA
testing. . . .” The pre-conviction DNA testing provision would be similarly implicated, allowing
for DNA testing without the limiting “biological material” language. See D.C. CODE § 22-4132
(2001 & Supp. 2012). Consequently, the definition of “DNA testing” would read: “‘DNA
testing’ means forensic analysis of DNA.” See D.C. CODE § 22-4131(5) (2001 & Supp. 2012).

2013]

Touch DNA in Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statutes

851

guilt or innocence.205 Importantly, a stricter materiality requirement reduces
the amount and type of testing available to the petitioner, which in turn helps to
conserve state resources and ensure the finality of judgment.206 This type of
materiality requirement, however, does not preclude the use of touch DNA
evidence in the proper context; a request for touch DNA testing can satisfy
most materiality standards if the testing is performed for exclusionary purposes
only.207 Although a more liberally construed statute will permit touch DNA
testing to exclude the petitioner,208 even the most conservative and restrictive
materiality standards can support touch DNA testing for purposes of
exclusion.209
A materiality requirement necessitating exclusionary testing can also combat
some of the problems with touch DNA technology.210 Restricting touch DNA
testing to exclusion nullifies concerns about touch DNA testing’s deficiencies
in positively identifying third-party perpetrators.211 The petitioner could use
the testing to indicate that his or her DNA was not present at the crime scene at
all, thus excluding him or her as the culpable party.212 The important interests
a strict materiality standard serves, coupled with the benefits of the
exclusionary requirement such a standard would mandate, indicate that a
205. But see MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Proc. § 8-201(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012)
(resembling a relevancy requirement and connecting the testing only to a general “claim of
wrongful conviction or sentencing”). This is undoubtedly a less severe requirement of
materiality.
206. State v. Dupigney, 988 A.2d 851, 860 (Conn. 2010) (citing Dist. Attorney’s Office for
the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 80–84 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring)).
207. See supra Part II.A.2 (explaining, in part, that strict materiality requirements can still
allow for touch DNA testing).
208. Because Maryland’s section 8-201 requires only that the testing be relevant to a claim of
wrongful conviction, testing is allowable in order to implicate a third party. See MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(c)(1); Gregg v. State, 976 A.2d 999, 1002–03 (Md. 2009) (permitting touch
DNA testing to identify the true perpetrator of the crime). The absence of the petitioner’s DNA
would be equally relevant, and perhaps more probative.
209. See supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text (explaining how exclusionary testing of
touch DNA could satisfy the materiality requirements of the District of Columbia and Texas); see
also Montez v. State, 86 So. 3d 1243, 1245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (describing the probative
value of exclusion by noting that “in [a] case involving largely circumstantial evidence, it is
difficult to imagine that the existence of another person’s [touch] DNA on the murder weapon
[thus excluding the petitioner] would not have created at least some reasonable doubt in the minds
of jurors”).
210. See supra notes 59–65 and accompanying text (discussing some problems that limit
touch DNA testing’s acceptance).
211. See, e.g., Hood v. United States, 28 A.3d 553, 565 (D.C. 2011) (explaining that “the
presence of third-party skin cells on [the] objects [in question] might mean someone other than
appellant or [victim] touch them at some point in time; but that proves nothing, because it would
not mean that the cells were deposited on the items” at the time of the crime).
212. The idea of using DNA for exclusionary purposes is not novel. With the development
of PCR amplification, scientists found that the differences between PCR and its RFLP
predecessor made PCR more appropriate for exclusion. United States v. Morrow, 374 F. Supp.
2d 51, 65 (D.D.C. 2005).
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materiality requirement implicating the petitioner’s guilt or innocence is the
most appropriate to ensure the effective use of touch DNA analysis. 213
Consequently, the IPA’s current materiality requirement should remain intact,
with the understanding that touch DNA testing is only material where it can
exclude the petitioner.214
IV. CONCLUSION
The District of Columbia is in a unique position. Not only has the
jurisdiction’s highest court been the first to definitively repudiate the use of
touch DNA testing post-conviction, but the D.C. Council has initiated an
amendment process to correct the unduly restrictive IPA in order to better
reflect its purpose: to confer a post-conviction right to a petitioner to prove his
or her actual innocence. Therefore, the District of Columbia has the
opportunity to serve as an example, both for those jurisdictions that have not
yet considered touch DNA and for those that have. The effective revision of
the IPA has the potential to ensure a statutory construction that will allow for
touch DNA testing in appropriate situations.
The most effective post-conviction DNA testing statute recognizes the
relationship between the materiality and biological material requirements.
They impose both a materiality requirement that restricts touch DNA testing to
exclusionary situations and a technologically neutral biological material
requirement, which remove the determination of whether evidence will
produce a usable sample from the discretion of the court. This statutory
structure appropriately balances the rights of the petitioner to potentially
exonerative evidence with the preservation of state resources, a balance that
many post-conviction testing statutes are designed to reflect but have been
unable to achieve. Balancing these requirements is paramount to provide
wrongfully convicted petitioners access to the same testing that aided in the
exoneration of Timothy Masters.
213. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102kk(b)(1) (2009) (requiring that testing establish a
reasonable probability that a jury would not have convicted the petitioner if he had presented
exculpatory DNA evidence at trial); D.C. CODE § 22-4133(d) (2001 & Supp. 2012) (requiring a
reasonable probability that testing will help in proving actual innocence);TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012) (requiring that the petitioner establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that if exculpatory DNA testing had been admitted at trial, the jury
would not have convicted him or her). Each of these requirements are conceptually similar,
requiring evidence that speaks to the petitioner’s guilt, albeit based on different standards of
proof.
214. The materiality language in D.C. CODE § 22-4133(d) reads:
The court shall order DNA testing pursuant to an application made under subsection (a)
of this section upon a determination that the application meets the criteria set forth in
subsections (a) and (b) of this section and there is a reasonable probability that testing
will produce non-cumulative evidence that would help establish that the applicant was
actually innocent of the crime for which the applicant was convicted or adjudicated as
delinquent.

